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Michael DiLorenzo
Looking at Substance Use
Disorders through the Lenses
of Self Psychology and
Existential Psychotherapy:
A Theoretical Study
ABSTRACT
This theoretical study explored the theoretical frameworks of self psychology and
existential psychotherapy in the context of their usefulness for clinical social workers in
their therapeutic work with clients with substance use disorders (SUDs). The central
guiding question of this thesis was, “How can the theoretical lenses of self psychology
and existential psychotherapy help clinical social workers and other mental health
professionals to better understand SUDs and inform clinicians’ work with addicted
clients?”
In this theoretical study, self psychology and existential psychotherapy were
examined and employed as a means of understanding the nature of SUDs. In addition,
these two theories were used to analyze and interpret the underlying psychological and
existential factors that may contribute to the development and persistence of SUDs in
some individuals. This study concluded that both self psychology and existential
psychotherapy can be useful—separately and even more so together—to clinicians in
their work with clients with SUDs.
Both of these theories, despite their many differences, share a number of
important similarities that make them useful for clinical social work. These include an
optimistic view of the potential for growth and healing through treatment; the importance
of imperfect attunement and empathic failures between therapist and client during the

course of therapy; an emphasis on trying to understand the client’s subjective experience;
and a genuinely humane and respectful view of all clients, including those struggling with
SUDs.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In the latest National Survey on Drug Use and Health, it was estimated that today
in the United States there are more than 22 million people over the age of 12 who have
been classified as having a substance use disorder (SUD) (Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration [SAMHSA], 2008). While many of the individuals who
are in need of substance abuse treatment never actually receive any, SUDs remain a
common precipitating factor for individuals who seek or are mandated for treatment at
facilities where they are likely to encounter clinical social workers and other mental
health clinicians. Moreover, since drug and alcohol problems are so common among
clinical populations, every mental health clinician is, at one time or another, likely to
have clients with SUDs in his or her caseload, whether or not an SUD was the
“presenting problem” that led a particular client to seek treatment initially (Washton &
Zweben, 2006).
Given the scope of the problem, it is important for all mental health clinicians to
be familiar with SUD symptomatology and treatment approaches that are useful when
working with clients with SUDs. Further, it is particularly important for clinicians to be
aware of the possible underlying or co-occurring psychological and existential factors
that may initially lead individuals to abuse and/or become dependent on substances, and
that contribute to the persistence of these patterns of substance abuse and dependence
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over time. A guiding premise of this project is that both of the two selected theories—self
psychology and existential psychotherapy—can be useful (separately and, even more so,
together) to clinicians in their work with clients with SUDs, both as a way of
understanding the nature of their clients’ problems and as a helpful framework on which
to base their clinical interventions.
The subject of SUDs has been examined extensively over a fairly long period of
time from a variety of theoretical standpoints. A number of early psychoanalytic thinkers,
including Freud and those that followed, began to consider and examine the phenomenon
of addiction in the early part of the 20th Century. Many of the early psychoanalytic
writings dealing with the subject of alcohol and drug addiction were steeped in the idea
that problems involving innate sexual and aggressive drives were what led certain
individuals to abuse and become dependent on alcohol or drugs (Freud, 1897; Abraham,
1908/1926; Glover, 1932; Radó, 1933). Later writings discussed other factors and viewed
the problem of addiction from a number of different perspectives. Some writers focused
on the idea of substance use as an artificial means of affect-regulation (Wurmser, 1974;
Krystal, 1978; Morgenstern and Leeds, 1993; Washton & Zweben, 2006) or an attempt at
self-medication (Khantzian, 1985/1997; Washton and Zweben, 2006) and/or selfregulation (Khantzian, 2007).
Others have been critical of psychoanalytic and psychodynamic perspectives on
addiction, including those who believe that they do not give sufficient weight to the
impact of an individual’s social environment on his or her decision to use alcohol or
drugs (Zinberg, 1975). Addiction has also been examined from the perspective of
cognitive theory, which holds that certain individuals become dependent on drugs and/or
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alcohol largely as the result of a set of dysfunctional beliefs they have about substance
use and what it does for them (Beck, Wright, Newman, & Liese, 1993). More recently,
some writers have called attention to brain research findings which seem to indicate that
addiction is a chemically and biologically based brain disease (Washton & Zweben,
2006). Others have sought to frame addiction not as a something secondary to underlying
psychological disturbances, but rather as a separate, primary illness (Brickman, 1988).
The central guiding question of this thesis is, “How can the theoretical lenses of
self psychology and existential psychotherapy help clinical social workers and other
mental health professionals to better understand SUDs and inform clinicians’ work with
addicted clients?” In this theoretical study, self psychology and existential psychotherapy
are examined and employed as a means of understanding the nature of SUDs. In addition,
these two theories are used to analyze and interpret certain underlying psychological and
existential factors that may contribute to the development and persistence of SUDs in
some individuals.
In this thesis the focus will be on two particular theoretical perspectives—self
psychology and existential psychotherapy. Each of these theories has a different
perspective regarding the nature of SUDs (and psychopathology in general). From a self
psychology perspective, SUDs and other forms of psychopathology are the result of
deficits—in particular, defects or weakness in the self resulting from problems and
disruptions during early self-selfobject relationships (Kohut, 1977a); substance use is an
attempt to make up for this deficit (Goldstein, 2001). From the point of view of
existential psychotherapy, SUDs and other forms of psychopathology are the result of
conflict—in this case, conflict brought about by an individual’s confrontation with certain
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existential realities or ultimate concerns—the “givens of human existence” as Yalom
(1980) refers to them (i.e., death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness). From an
existential perspective, substance use is seen as a maladaptive defense against existential
anxiety. One goal of this study is to show that these two theories need not be seen as
incompatible with one another when it comes to the issue of understanding and treating
SUDs. Rather it will be argued that while each on its own has something valuable to offer
to clinicians working with addicted clients, both can also be used in conjunction with one
other in a way that will be helpful to the therapeutic work with clients struggling with
SUDs.
Before proceeding, it is worth calling attention to areas of potential bias on the
part of this writer in relation to the present study. My interest in the topic of SUDs came
at least in part as a result of my experience working with clients in an outpatient
substance abuse treatment program during the past year. I believe that part of the reason
that I was drawn to the two theories that are focused on in the present study is also the
result of this experience working with addicted clients, some of whom I worked with for
a period of several months, during which time I came to know and respect them and their
struggles. I believe that my choice of self psychology and existential psychotherapy as
the two theories of focus for the purpose of this study had to do in large part with my
belief that both of these theories, despite their many differences, share a number of
important similarities. These include an optimistic view of the potential for growth and
healing through treatment; an emphasis on trying to understand the client’s subjective
experience; and what I feel is an especially humane and respectful view of all clients,
including those struggling with SUDs.
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CHAPTER II
SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS

Introduction
In this chapter, the reader is presented with an overview of substance use
disorders (SUDs). In order to illustrate the ways in which clinical and popular views of
SUDs in the US have changed over time, this chapter begins with the evolution of the
diagnostic categories and criteria of SUDs, as described in the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), from the time of the publishing of the first edition in
1952 through the most recent edition, DSM-IV-TR (4th edition, text revision), published in
2000. A description of the extent to which SUDs impact the population of the US today is
then presented. This is accomplished by means of a brief summary of the most recently
available numbers and demographic information regarding the prevalence of SUDs in the
US. Following this description of the affected population, data showing the need—both
met and unmet—for treatment among individuals with SUDs is presented. The chapter
concludes with a review of the literature in which a variety of theoretical approaches to
understanding the nature of SUDs are discussed and summarized. One point of focus
throughout this review of the SUD literature will be directed toward possible underlying
issues, as well as possible developmental or experiential factors, that might lead
individuals with SUDs to begin and/or continue their use and abuse of drugs and alcohol.
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Evolving Diagnostic Categories
In 1952, when the first edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM) was published, SUDs were grouped under personality disorders rather
than being separated out and defined as their own distinct diagnostic category (Saunders,
Schuckit, Sirovatka, & Regier, 2007). Within the larger category of personality disorders,
the DSM (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1952) defined alcoholism as “cases
in which there is well established addiction to alcohol without recognizable underlying
disorder” (p. 39) while drug addiction was not defined in specific terms, but was viewed
as being “usually symptomatic of a personality disorder” (p. 39). One point worth noting
here is the way that alcohol and drugs were treated as completely separate types of
substances. As described in this edition of the DSM, alcoholism was not understood to be
indicative of any other sort of psychopathology, whereas drug addiction was seen to be a
symptom of some defect in one’s personality (APA, 1952).
In the second edition, DSM-II, published in 1968, SUDs were again grouped
under personality disorders and had very little in the way of specific definitions or
diagnostic criteria. Alcoholism was described as a condition in which one’s alcohol intake
has reached a point whereby he or she is damaging his or her physical health or personal
or social functioning, or when consuming alcohol is actually necessary in order to reach a
point of normal functioning. A diagnosis of drug dependence required only that the
individual in question show evidence of habitual use or need of the drug; no mention is
made of any impairment to one’s health or functioning being necessary in the case of
drug dependence (APA, 1968). Here again, as with the previous edition of the DSM
(1952), we see the way that alcohol and drugs were viewed differently. A diagnosis of
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alcoholism required that one’s health or functioning was impaired to some degree, while
a diagnosis of drug dependence seemed only to look at whether or not one exhibited
habitual use or need; impairment was not considered to be a criterion (APA, 1968).
The third edition, DSM-III, published in 1980, represented a major change in the
way that SUDs were categorized and described. Unlike in the previous two editions, in
DSM-III SUDs were identified as a distinct diagnostic category containing the two
separate diagnoses of substance abuse and substance dependence, each with its own set
of diagnostic criteria. For substance abuse, there were three criteria distinguishing abuse
from normal use: a pattern of pathological use, impairment in social or occupational
functioning, and duration of at least one month. The two criteria for substance
dependence, only one of which had to be present for a diagnosis of dependence to be
indicated—except for alcohol and cannabis dependence, which required evidence of
social or occupational impairment as well—were tolerance and withdrawal (APA, 1980).
Another significant change seen in this edition is the similar treatment of alcohol and
drugs, unlike in the previous two editions where alcoholism and drug addiction, while
grouped together under the larger category of personality disorders, were viewed quite
differently with regard to their respective diagnostic criteria.
Today, as defined in the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV), the category of SUDs is used as an umbrella term that includes the
two separate diagnoses of substance dependence and substance abuse (APA, 2000). In
DSM-IV, substance dependence is viewed as a more serious condition than substance
abuse, and an individual cannot be diagnosed with both conditions during the same time
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period; a diagnosis of dependence would preempt an earlier diagnosis of abuse (Saunders
et al., 2007).
According to the definition found in DSM-IV, substance dependence refers to a
“maladaptive pattern of substance use, leading to clinically significant impairment or
distress” (APA, 2000, p. 199) and which is evidenced by the occurrence of any three (or
more) of the following symptoms within a twelve month period: tolerance; withdrawal;
taking the substance in larger amounts or over a longer period of time than originally
intended; persistent unsuccessful attempts to cut down or stop use of the substance;
spending a great deal of time obtaining the substance, using the substance, or recovering
from its effects; reducing or giving up important social, occupational, and/or recreational
activities because of substance use; continuing use of the substance despite recognizing
that such use is causing serious psychological and/or physical problems for the user.
Substance abuse is indicated by the occurrence of any one (or more) of the
following symptoms within a twelve month period: failure to fulfill major obligations at
home, school, or work because of substance use; use of the substance even in situations
where it might be physically dangerous to do so (e.g., driving when intoxicated); legal
problems related to substance use; continuing use of the substance despite recognizing
that such use is causing social or interpersonal problems for the user. Substance abuse,
unlike substance dependence, does not include tolerance, withdrawal or compulsive use
as diagnostic criteria (APA, 2000).
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Population
In the latest National Survey on Drug Use and Health, the Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) estimated that today in the United
States there are 22.3 million people aged 12 and older—9% of that population—who
have been classified as having a SUD related to their use of alcohol and/or illicit drugs.
Of these, 3.2 million were classified with an SUD involving both alcohol and illicit
drugs, 3.7 million were classified with an SUD involving illicit drugs only, and 15.5
million were classified with an SUD involving alcohol only. The use of the term “illicit
drugs” is meant here to include cannabis (e.g., marijuana, hashish); cocaine, including
crack; heroin; hallucinogens; inhalants; and the non-medical use of prescription-type pain
relievers, tranquilizers, stimulants, and sedatives (SAMHSA, 2008)
Among the 22.3 million people who were classified as having an SUD in 2007,
the rate of SUDs was about twice as high for males (12.5%) as it was for females (5.7%)
among those aged 12 and over. However, rates were similar among males (7.7%) and
females (7.7%) between the ages of 12 and 17. With regard to race and ethnicity, the rate
of SUDs was lowest among Asians (4.7%) and highest among Native Americans
(13.4%). Other reported racial/ethnic group rates included individuals reporting two or
more races (10.8%), Hawaiians/ Pacific Islanders (9.9%), Whites (9.4%), Blacks (8.5%),
and Hispanics (8.3%). These numbers remained similar during the years 2002 through
2007 (SAMHSA, 2008).
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Need for Treatment
SAMHSA (2008) estimated that of the 22.3 million individuals aged 12 and older
who were in need of treatment for SUDs in 2007, approximately 2.4 million (10.4% of
those in need) received treatment at a specialty facility such as a hospital (inpatient only),
a drug or alcohol rehabilitation facility (inpatient or outpatient), or a mental health center.
The remaining 20.8 million people needed treatment for an SUD but did not receive
treatment at a specialty substance abuse facility. However, some of the 22.3 million
people who were in need of treatment did receive treatment at places other than facilities
specializing in drug or alcohol treatment, including, emergency rooms, private doctor's
offices, prisons/jails, and self-help groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics
Anonymous.
Despite the fact that many individuals who are in need of treatment do not receive
it, SUDs remain a common precipitating factor for individuals who seek or are mandated
for treatment at facilities where they are likely to encounter clinical social workers and
other mental health professionals. Moreover, since drug and alcohol problems are so
common among clinical populations, every mental health clinician is, at one time or
another, likely to have clients with SUDs in his or her caseload (Washton & Zweben,
2006).
Given the scope of the problem and the large numbers of individuals who are in
need of and/or who seek treatment as a result of SUDs, it is important for all mental
health professionals to be familiar with SUD symptomatology and treatment options.
Further, it is particularly important that they be aware of the possible underlying or cooccurring psychological and existential factors that may initially lead individuals to abuse
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and/or become dependent on substances, and/or perpetuate these patterns of substance
abuse and dependence over time. The following section discusses a number of
theoretical approaches to understanding SUDs; issues of underlying psychological and
existential factors as it has been addressed by several different authors is discussed.

Understanding Substance Use Disorders: Theoretical Approaches
Early Psychoanalytic Writings
Psychoanalysis has been cited by one author as “the first modern discipline to
study addiction” (Yalisove, 1997). Much of the early psychoanalytic writings dealing
with the subject of drug and alcohol dependence were steeped in the idea that innate
sexual and aggressive drives are what lead some individuals to abuse and become
dependent on drugs or alcohol (Freud, 1897; Abraham, 1908/1926; Glover, 1932; Radó,
1933). As early as 1897, in a letter to his friend, Wilhelm Fliess, Freud (1897) wrote of
his realization that masturbation was the “primal addiction” (p. 272) for which all other
addictions (e.g., drug and alcohol dependence) were merely substitutes or replacements
(Freud, 1897). This realization of Freud’s occurred at a time when he had begun to
believe that the sexual drive was at the root of all psychic conflict and psychopathology
(Mitchell & Black, 1995).
In what is likely the first psychoanalytic article devoted entirely to the subject of
addiction, Abraham (1908/1926) wrote of alcoholism as a kind of sexual perversion, one
that interacts with the sexual instinct and which results in the removal of inhibitions and
an increase in sexual activity. Abraham also saw a connection between drinking and
homosexuality. He believed that in normal individuals, “the homosexual component of
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the sexual instinct yields to sublimation” (i.e., it is contained, redirected, and released in
the form of more socially acceptable behavior) but that in the case of the alcoholic, “the
homosexual component-instincts … reappear in no veiled form under the influence of
alcohol” (p. 4).
Glover (1932) saw a connection between drug addiction and the psychoses and
believed that aggressive drives were important in the etiology of drug addiction
(Khantzian, 2003). He described the defensive function of drug addiction, which he saw
as a means of controlling aggressive impulses and a means of preventing psychotic
reactions to situations when an individual is in a state of regression (Glover, 1932). In a
paper in which he examined the psychodynamics of alcoholism, Knight (1937/1997)
referred to the excessive drinking of the alcoholic as a symptom of a serious, underlying
personality disorder. He believed that alcoholics drink in an attempt to manage their
difficult feelings and emotions and he argued that abstinence from alcohol would not
solve the alcoholic’s problem, but would only make the nature of the underlying
personality disorder more apparent.
In keeping with the themes discussed by many of his psychoanalytic colleagues,
Radó, in his 1933 paper, The Psychoanalysis of Pharmacothymia (Drug Addiction),
described the pleasure-seeking aspects of drug use, referring to the “stimulant and
euphoria-producing effects” (p. 4) of drugs. However, in the same paper, Radó also
called attention to the pain-removing qualities of certain drugs and how these drugs may
be used by certain individuals in order to manage their emotions and alleviate psychic
distress. He asserted that both of these aspects—the pleasure-seeking and the painremoving effects of drugs—are rooted in the pleasure principle and together “constitute
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what may be called the ‘pharmacogenic pleasure-effect’” (p. 4). Radó’s attention to the
ways that individuals attempt, through their use of drugs, to alleviate distress and manage
their emotional states moved psychoanalysis beyond a purely drive-oriented
interpretation of addiction and toward an understanding of drug use as an individual’s
attempt at adaptation and self-regulation (Yalisove, 1997).
Radó’s 1933 paper has been cited by at least one author as the work that launched
“the modern psychoanalytic understanding of addiction” (Yalisove, 1997, p. 2). In
addition, an earlier paper by Radó (1928) described how drugs and alcohol may serve to
strengthen ego functions—e.g., impulse control, modulation of affect, self-esteem
regulation (Berzoff, Flanagan, & Hertz, 2002)—and serve to manage and regulate
internal tension and feelings of distress. These ideas presented by Radó (1928), as well as
some of those presented by Glover (1933) regarding the defensive functions of drug use,
acknowledged the adaptive role of addictive substances and marked “the beginning
influence of ego psychology on the understanding of addiction” (Yalisove, 1997, p. 2). A
number of more recent authors have taken up the theme of SUDs as an individual’s
attempt to shore up ego functions and manage difficult emotions. Several of these are
discussed in the following section.

Evolving Psychodynamic Perspectives
Affect Regulation. Krystal (1978) looked closely at affective disturbances and
described how individuals with SUDs find it difficult, or completely lack the ability, to
clearly identify or differentiate among the various affective states they experience.
Krystal (1978) and Washton and Zweben (2006) have argued that individuals with SUDs
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experience an affective disturbance known as alexithymia, a condition in which emotions
come as vague, undifferentiated sensations and individuals don’t really know what they
are feeling at any given moment. Krystal believed that alexithymic individuals experience
affects in a somatic fashion, so affects come over them as physical sensations rather than
feelings. Krystal (1978) has also argued that, due to problems during early development
which resulted in disturbed object relations, individuals with SUDs experience a great
deal of ambivalence in their feelings toward other people. They also exhibit impairments
in autonomous functioning, especially with regard to functions such as self-control and
self-care. Such impairments cause individuals with SUDs to feel that they need to rely on
something external—e.g., substances or other people—in order to take care of themselves
and maintain a sense of stability (Krystal, 1978, as cited in Morgenstern & Leeds, 1993).
Wurmser (1974) described drug addiction as a symptom of an underlying
disturbance rather than an illness in and of itself. He saw the use of drugs as an effort at
self-treatment and, echoing a number of earlier psychoanalytic thinkers, he argued that
drugs were employed as “an artificial or surrogate defense against overwhelming affects”
(p. 829). Wurmser also believed that there is significance to the particular drug that is
selected by an individual, since different drugs have different effects, and drug users will
tend eventually to settle on those substances that help them best to cope with the
particular affects that cause them the most distress. Wurmser attributes the initiation of
compulsive drug use in most cases to an acute narcissistic crisis, often occurring during
adolescence and precipitated by one or more events in which an individual experiences
intense feelings of disappointment, either toward others or toward him- or herself. In such
a crisis, the individual is overwhelmed with difficult feelings and is unable to cope
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without some kind of artificial defense (Wurmser, 1974). Morgenstern and Leeds (1993),
in their discussion of the work of several contemporary psychoanalytic thinkers, assert
that there is unanimity among all of them that affect tolerance is a key factor in the
experience of substance abusers. Furthermore, they observe that, while there may be
differing opinions regarding the underlying cause of substance abuse, all psychoanalytic
thinkers agree that the abuse of drugs and alcohol is an attempt at managing or avoiding
difficult feelings through artificial means. Instead of feelings, they argue, individuals with
SUDs have drugs and alcohol.
Self-Medication. Recognition of the negative impact of stigma and guilt on
individuals with SUDs has been discussed elsewhere in the literature. Khantzian (2003)
has been critical of what he sees as the undue emphasis that was placed on the
pleasurable and euphoric aspects of drug use stressed by many of the early
psychoanalytic thinkers, including Freud (1897), Abraham (1908/1926), and Radó
(1933). Khantzian has argued that this emphasis has resulted in the stigmatization of drug
and alcohol addiction and the perception of SUDs as a moral problem rather than a health
problem. Khantzian (1985/1997) has proposed his self-medication hypothesis (SMH) as a
way of understanding and explaining how it is that some individuals become dependent
on drugs and/or alcohol. According to the SMH, addicts use substances not simply
because they are “seeking escape, euphoria, or self-destruction” (p. 438); rather they turn
to drugs and alcohol in an attempt to self-medicate and find relief from their psychiatric
problems and difficult emotions. In Khantzian’s view, substance abuse is thus an attempt
at self-repair and compensation that is ultimately unsuccessful and self-defeating.
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Washton and Zweben (2006) have cited the SMH as providing a valuable
perspective in clinical work with individuals with SUDs because it helps clinicians to
understand and appreciate what the use and effects of substances mean to addicted
individuals; it helps to shed light the role that drugs and alcohol play in these individuals’
lives and what they are seeking through their substance use. Khantzian (2003), like
Wurmser (1974) and others, argues that individuals are most likely to settle eventually on
a particular substance or combination of substances, the effects of which seem to help
them most with their particular type of distress. For example, individuals who struggle
with feelings of anger and rage are often attracted to heroin and other opiates, while those
who frequently feel depressed or lethargic often come to prefer the effects of stimulants
such as cocaine or amphetamines (Khantzian, 2007). Khantzian (2007) has stressed the
importance of understanding SUDs as a “self-regulation disorder,” (p. 8) resulting from
problems and failures during development that result in deficits and leave some
individuals unable to care for themselves properly.
Self Psychology. Weegman (2002), in his examination of SUDs from a self
psychology perspective, argues that “extensive damage to the self” (p. 49) is present in
some individuals long before they become addicted to drugs. He does not, however, focus
on SUDs as just an outcome of this earlier damage, arguing that clinicians don’t have to
feel forced into making this determination in order to effectively engage with and treat
individuals with SUDs. Rather, he stresses the need to focus on the present and to
appreciate the continuous “tragic interaction” (p. 49) between the damage and the
addiction, the result of which is a destructive and self-perpetuating spiral.
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Kohut (1977a) sees in the addicted individual “a central weakness … in the core
of his personality [and] a defect in the self” (p. vii). In his view, substance abuse is an
attempt—one that will ultimately be unsuccessful—to somehow alleviate the distress
caused by this defect. In Kohut’s self psychology, selfobjects are objects outside of the
self “that give the self what it needs in order to become and remain energetic and
cohesive” (Berzoff, Flanagan, & Hertz, 2002, p. 181). While it is true that selfobjects are
most often other people, they can also be things, some common examples of which are
music, literature, and art. Kohut (1977a) argued that, for an individual with an SUD, the
substance becomes a substitute for a selfobject that failed the individual traumatically at
some point earlier in his or her development. Kohut saw ingestion of a drug as an attempt
to fulfill needs that were not previously met as they should have been by an individual’s
selfobjects. Goldstein (2001) describes the addicted individual as one who has an
increased vulnerability to using substances because of a lack of proper internal self
structures; substance use is an attempt to make up for this deficit.
Criticism of Psychodynamic Approaches. Zinberg (1975) has argued that most
psychoanalytic thinkers have not paid enough attention to the importance of the social
environment when examining the motivation for a particular individual to use illicit
drugs. He asserts that “drug, set, and setting” (p. 567) all must be taken into account in
order to reach such an understanding. He is also somewhat dismissive of the tendency, as
he sees it, to attribute SUDs to individuals with particular personality types and
unresolved conflicts from early in their development. Zinberg claims that such attribution
“is based on retrospective falsification” (p. 568); he believes that one cannot assume that
a drug-addicted individual’s attitude and personality are necessarily the same as they
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were before the addiction began. He argues that most psychoanalytic thinkers make just
such an assumption—they observe the addicted individual in the present and then try to
show that his or her drug addiction was the inevitable result of a long-term process
involving developmental problems and disruptions in early relationships (Zinberg, 1975).

The Disease Concept of Addiction
Brickman (1988) has echoed some of the ideas presented by Zinberg (1975),
specifically with regard to the idea of a psychoanalytic interpretation of drug abuse being
essentially retrospective. Brickman has argued that it is often not possible for the
psychoanalytic observer to determine with certainty any cause and effect relationship in
cases of drug and alcohol addiction when considering the psychopathology of an
individual with an SUD. Brickman discounts the idea that SUDs are necessarily
secondary to underlying psychological disturbances and is dismissive of the belief that
psychoanalytic insight offers any real hope of success in the treatment of SUDs.
Brickman believes it is important to view substance abuse/dependence as a separate,
primary illness, one that would require a “direct, nonpsychoanalytic intervention strategy
leading to total chemical abstinence if analysis is to succeed” (p. 360). In order to add
weight to his argument against the idea that SUDs are secondary to underlying
psychopathology, he observed that one could see “the entire spectrum of
psychopathology as a result of drug and alcohol intoxication” (p. 363) and he points to
examples such as depression, anxiety, psychosis, and suicidal ideation. Similarly,
Vaillant (1983), asserts that most of the psychopathological symptoms exhibited by
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alcoholics, are actually the result, rather than the cause, of alcohol abuse—i.e.,
“alcoholism is the horse, not the cart, of mental illness” (p. 317).
Washton and Zweben (2006) observed that there is a growing body of evidence in
the literature that points toward the conclusion that addiction is a chemically and
biologically based brain disease. They discuss the existence of certain predisposing
characteristics—e.g., an endorphin deficiency—that may make one individual more
prone to developing an SUD than another individual who is not predisposed in such a
way. Furthermore, they go on to describe the way that the continued use of drugs and/or
alcohol by individuals who are biologically predisposed to developing an SUD can alter
the chemistry of the brain in such a way that it is unable to return to its normal state, even
after use has stopped. This, according to the authors, leaves such individuals forever at an
increased risk for relapse and uncontrolled substance use. The authors assert that the
disease concept, first proposed by Jellinek in a 1960 paper on alcoholism, has been well
supported by recent research into the workings of the human brain. They also argue that
the disease concept of addiction is especially useful in clinical work because it helps to
reduce stigma and lessen a treatment-seeking individual’s feelings of shame and guilt that
might otherwise interfere with treatment (Washton & Zweben, 2006).
Flores (2004), writing from the disease perspective, states that addiction should
not be viewed as “a symptom of a more serious core issue” (p. 15). Rather, it should be
treated as a primary condition that must be dealt with directly and immediately. Flores
asserts, as others writing from the disease perspective have done, that total abstinence
from all substances should be seen as the most important and immediate goal of
treatment. At the root of this emphasis lies the belief that individuals with SUDs will not
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be able to benefit from psychotherapy as long as they are still actively using drugs or
alcohol. Moreover, Flores (2004), like Washton and Zweben (2006), cites recent research
involving brain imagery that shows evidence of chemical changes that can occur in the
brain of an individual who uses drugs and/or alcohol in large enough quantities and over
a long enough period of time. Such changes, Flores writes, involve permanent alterations
to one’s neurophysiology and brain functioning (Flores, 2004).

Cognitive Theory
Viewing SUDs from a cognitive perspective, Beck, Wright, Newman, and Liese
(1993) have argued that one of the major reasons that certain individuals become
dependent on drugs and/or alcohol is because of a set of dysfunctional beliefs they have
about substance use and what it does for them. These addictive beliefs, as the authors
refer to them, stem from “a cluster of ideas centering around pleasure seeking, problem
solving, relief, and escape, [as well as] justification, risk taking, and entitlement” (p. 38).
As with many other theoretical approaches, in the cognitive model of addiction, the role
of an individual’s emotional reactions to internal and external stimuli are acknowledged
as being an important factor in his/her substance use. Beck et al. (1993) observe that
addictive beliefs are exhibited by individuals only after they have become dependent on
drugs or alcohol, and should not be seen as having caused or predisposed them to their
addiction. However, once an individual has become addicted, these addictive beliefs do
serve to perpetuate the addiction and place these individuals at increased and constant
risk of relapse. With regard to the issue of what might predispose some individuals to
develop SUDs, the authors assert that there are certain characteristics that may be evident
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in certain individuals even before their drug use began. These could include, among
others, a heightened sensitivity to unpleasant feelings, poor coping skills, a tendency to
act on sudden impulses without considering consequences, and low tolerance for feelings
of boredom and/or frustration (Beck et al., 1993).

Existential Psychotherapy
Frankl (1967, as cited in Nicholson et al., 1994) has argued that individuals could
develop SUDs because they lack meaning in their lives. If one views the problem of
SUDs through the lens of logotherapy, Frankl’s particular model of existential
psychotherapy, one might see drug addiction or alcoholism as being rooted in an
individual’s belief that his/her life is meaningless. Frankl believed that the search for
meaning and purpose was the proper and ultimate drive of all human beings; he referred
to this human characteristic as the “will to meaning” (Frankl, 1959, p. 121). He argued
that if this quest was somehow blocked or disrupted the result will be a sort of existential
vacuum in which the affected individual’s life will become devoid of meaning. The use
of drugs and alcohol can thus be viewed as an attempt to fill this existential vacuum
(Frankl, 1967, as cited in Nicholson et al., 1994). Hull (1987) too acknowledges the
importance of meaning and argues that if individuals are able to commit to some sort of
positive purpose in their lives, they will be better able to manage stress and deal with
difficult situations and feelings. Moreover, with regard to those individuals who have
ceased their substance use and are now in recovery, he identifies the ability to establish a
sense of meaning and purpose in life as a key component of relapse management (Hull,
1987).
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Binswanger (1944/1958a), one of the earliest and most influential thinkers in the
field of existential psychotherapy, describes toxicomania (i.e., addiction) as a case in
which one sees a “striking case of universal existential craving to which the ‘decisioninhibited’ man falls prey” (p. 347). In his discussion of the experience of an addicted
individual attempting to fulfill this existential craving, Binswanger describes a sort of
self-perpetuating cycle in which individuals attempt to fill the emptiness they feel and
achieve enjoyment or pleasure by using drugs but then encounter shame and
disappointment when they are struck by the unreality of their experience. Such negative
feelings then compel these addicted individuals to repeat their substance use in yet
another attempt to escape or feel something more positive (Binswanger, 1944/1958a).
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CHAPTER III
SELF PSYCHOLOGY

Introduction
This chapter begins by providing some of the historical context and background
on Heinz Kohut and the development of self psychology. This chapter also introduces a
number of key terms and major concepts of self psychology, including selfobjects and
selfobject needs; Kohut’s concept of the tripolar self, consisting of the grandiose self, the
idealized parent imago, and the alter ego or twinship pole; and the process of
transmuting internalization. In addition, this chapter includes a brief discussion of the
ways in which these key concepts and terms are relevant to an understanding of
psychopathology from a self psychology perspective.
On a brief explanatory note, the term “selfobject”—which is used frequently in
this chapter—has been written in different ways throughout the relevant literature, so in
some quotations used here it is written as “selfobject,” while in others it is written as
“self-object.” Indeed, Kohut himself, in his earlier writings, used the hyphenated form,
but in later writings used the single, non-hyphenated form. I follow Kohut’s later writings
and the writings of several other authors and use “selfobject” in my own writing.
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History
Heinz Kohut
Heinz Kohut (1913-1989)—doctor, psychoanalyst, and founder of self
psychology—was born into a middle-class Jewish family in Vienna in 1913 and raised by
his mother and father. In 1932, at the age of nineteen, Kohut entered the University of
Vienna and enrolled in the medical faculty. He graduated with his medical degree and a
specialization in neurology in 1938 at the age of twenty-five. Nearing the end of his time
as a student, Kohut sought psychotherapeutic treatment with a handful of psychologists
and psychoanalysts in order to deal with the emptiness and grief he experienced due to
the loss of his father in 1937 (Strozier, 2001). These experiences with his own therapy—
not all of which were pleasant or successful—and with the loss of his father seem to have
contributed to Kohut’s growing interest in the field of psychotherapy. One biographer
observes that "Kohut's decisive move toward the world of psychotherapy was impelled
by the death of his father" (Strozier, 2001, p. 49). In 1940 Kohut made his way to the
United States and settled in Chicago, where he began working as a physician,
specializing in neurology. Over the next several years, Kohut gradually moved away
from medicine, toward psychiatry, and then into psychoanalysis, eventually becoming
deeply involved with the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis, where he received his
formal psychoanalytic training and went on to become a supervising and training analyst
and a member of the teaching faculty (Strozier, 2001; Siegel, 1996).
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Development of Self Psychology
During the 1950s and early 1960s, most of Kohut’s energy and work was directed
toward the theory and practice of classical psychoanalysis. He became increasingly
interested in those patients who presented with what was generally understood to be an
excessive an unhealthy amount of narcissism. From the point of view of classical
psychoanalysis, such patients were considered to be unanalyzable due to their excessive
self-absorption, a quality that would preclude the establishment of a transference within
the therapeutic relationship (Mitchell & Black, 1995). Since Freud viewed the ability to
develop a transference—i.e., the experience in which a patient brings into the therapeutic
relationship feelings based on experiences in past relationships (Berzoff, Flanagan, &
Hertz, 2002)—as a necessary requirement for the analytic process, patients with whom
this was not possible were generally considered to be poor candidates for psychoanalysis
(Mitchell & Black, 1995).
From the perspective of Freud’s (1914) drive theory, every person has a finite
amount of libidinal energy or libido and so whatever portion of it is directed outward,
toward objects—usually people—then that much less is available for directing inward,
toward one’s self (Berzoff, Flanagan, & Hertz, 2002). Thus it follows from this model
that self-love and object-love are mutually exclusive and, in a sense, in a zero-sum game
with one other with regard to the available reservoir of libidinal energy; an increase in
one requires a decrease in the other.
Freud believed that all infants are completely self-absorbed and that all of their
libidinal energy is directed inward in the form of self-love. He considered this total selfabsorption to be normal in the case of infants and viewed it as the natural starting point of
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human development (Berzoff, Flanagan, & Hertz, 2002). This infantile form of self-love
was labeled by Freud as primary narcissism and was meant to be distinguished from
secondary narcissism, the latter being “a return of the original early infantile
[narcissism]” (Freud, 1917, p. 424). According to Freud, in the course of normal
development, individuals move away from the totally inwardly focused self-love of the
infant and toward a stage where they begin to direct their libidinal energy outward and to
focus it on external objects (i.e., other people). Secondary narcissism was understood by
Freud to be a pathological state occurring later in life—often due to trauma, illness, or old
age—in which an individual begins to withdraw libidinal energy from objects and direct
it inward and back toward the self (Berzoff, Flanagan, & Hertz, 2002).
Largely as a result of his work with patients considered to have narcissistic
character disorders, Kohut came to question the validity and the effectiveness of the
classical psychoanalytic approach to working with such patients. In his 1914 essay, On
Narcissism: An Introduction, Freud had written that the “libido that has been withdrawn
from the external world has been directed to the ego and thus gives rise to an attitude
which may be called narcissism” (p. 75). Kohut rejected this premise that there must be a
negative correlation between self-love and love of others, and his own ideas on the topic
of narcissism led him to a drastic reformulation of Freud’s theory. In contrast to the
traditionally pejorative connotation that went along with the term narcissism, Kohut came
to the conclusion that a healthy amount of love for, and good feeling about oneself—i.e.,
an optimal degree of healthy narcissism—could actually be beneficial, and was even
quite necessary in one’s pursuit of healthy and fulfilling relationships with others. He
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believed that it would lead to a sense of “internal solidarity and vitality [and] self-esteem
that is reliable in the face of disappointments” (Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 158).
In his work with narcissistic patients, Kohut had also come to believe that the
classical approach—one in which interpretation, confrontation, and insight were seen as
the key tools that would lead to a “cure”—was misguided and based on incorrect
assumptions about the nature of these patients’ problems. Rather than going along with
the widely accepted view of narcissistic patients as being securely and confidently selfsatisfied, Kohut came to see these individuals as “quite fragile, tending to plummet
precipitously from a sense of soaring superiority to a clumsy crash landing on earth”
(Mitchell & Black, 1995, p. 155). In his work with narcissistic patients, Kohut had often
witnessed that beneath the outer surface layer of narcissism, these patients had deep
feelings of inadequacy and personalities rooted in painful past experiences with
humiliation. Furthermore, despite his background in classical psychoanalysis and his
onetime label of “Mr. Psychoanalysis” (Strozier, 2001, p. xiii) during his early analytic
career in Chicago, Kohut eventually came to reject Freud’s model of psychological
structure as being comprised of the id, ego, and superego. Nor did Kohut accept the
classical view that working through problems caused by intrapsychic conflict was the
way to psychological well-being and health. Instead, Kohut believed that a healthy self is
“derived from experiences in which caregiving others, known as selfobjects, meet the
specific needs of the emerging self” (Berzoff, Flanagan, & Hertz, 2002, p. 176). In
contrast with the classical psychoanalytic view based in Freud’s work, Kohut viewed
aggression and rage not as innate but as reactions resulting from frustration at not having
one’s needs met by an empathically attuned caregiver.
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Initially, Kohut believed the new insights he developed were applicable only to
his understanding of, and his work with, individuals with narcissistic personality
problems. However, Kohut (1984) eventually came to believe that flaws in the self—i.e.,
“defects in the structure of the self, … distortions of the self, … [or] weakness of the
self” (p. 53)—were at the root of all psychopathology and that such flaws are the result of
disruptions in the relationship between self and selfobjects during childhood. Selfobjects,
according to Kohut, are objects (usually people) outside of the self “that give the self
what it needs in order to become and remain energetic and cohesive” (Berzoff, Flanagan,
& Hertz, 2002, p. 181). Kohut believed that the formation of a cohesive self was at the
core of healthy psychological development for every individual. Some of self
psychology’s major concepts, including selfobjects and the notion of a cohesive self, will
be discussed in greater detail in the next section of this chapter.

Key Concepts
The Self
Kohut (1977b) referred to the self as “the center of the individual’s psychological
universe” (p. 311) and he regarded it as “the center of initiative of the person that
organizes experiences and regulates self-esteem” (Goldstein, 2001, p. 80). Kohut also
asserted that it is not possible to know, with any certainty, anything about the precise
nature of the self, beyond that which we can perceive by observing its psychological
manifestations. His assertion was that “the self”—its true essence—is not perceivable
through direct observation and therefore one cannot differentiate between ‘self’ and ‘self
representation,’ since the representation is all that can be observed (Kohut, 1977b). Kohut
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believed that the self is present at birth in a very basic form and that it evolves as a result
of interactions with and empathic responses from selfobjects that it encounters during its
development. Kohut stressed the importance of an “empathic matrix of relationships that
offer a combination of optimal empathic responsiveness and manageable empathic
failure” (Berzoff, Flanagan, & Hertz, 2002, p. 174) for the development of a healthy and
cohesive self.
Kohut believed that the self was comprised of three distinct poles—the grandiose
self, the idealized parent imago, and the alter ego or twinship pole—each with its own
particular selfobject needs. In his earlier writings, Kohut identified only two poles of the
self and thus referred to the self as “bipolar.” In this original conception, he identified the
pole of the grandiose self, the pole of the idealized parent imago, and “an intermediate
area of basic talents and skills … activated by a tension-arc that establishes itself between
ambitions [of the grandiose self] and ideals [of the idealized parent imago]” (Wolf, 1988,
p. 31). However, in his later writings, Kohut (1984) spoke of the alter ego or twinship
pole as being equal in importance to the other two poles, one with its own unique
qualities and selfobject needs. Kohut believed that in order for healthy, normal
development to occur, each of the three poles of this tripolar self requires selfobjects that
empathically respond to its developmental needs (Kohut, 1977b; Berzoff, Flanagan, &
Hertz, 2002).

Selfobjects
When one looks at the world through a self psychological lens, the importance of
the role played by selfobjects in an individual’s development cannot be overstated.
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Indeed, Kohut believed that the quality of the interactions between self and selfobjects
during childhood is what determines whether the self that emerges will be healthy or
damaged (Kohut & Wolf, 1978). Within the framework of self psychology, selfobjects
are likened to oxygen with regard to their importance for a child’s healthy development
(Kohut, 1977b). Early selfobjects can be described as “empathic or attuned caretakers
who perform vital functions [that the infant] cannot carry out for itself” (Goldstein, 2001,
p. 80). One example that is often used to illustrate this point is that of a caregiver who
acts to soothe the infant who has not yet reached the point where it has acquired the
ability to soothe itself in times of distress. The crucial role of caregivers is emphasized
often by Kohut and his ultimate message seems not so much to be about specific actions
that must be taken, but rather about the caregivers own selves as it were. He asserts that
“it is not so much what the parents do … but what the parents are” (Kohut & Wolf, 1978,
p. 417) that is the real influence on the child’s developing self and personality. If the
parents are confident, flexible, and self-aware, and if their own selves are cohesive and
healthy, then their child’s development is likely to be healthy as well.
As important as selfobjects’ empathically attuned responses to the needs of the
self are, Kohut held that certain non-traumatic empathic failures were inevitable and just
as important for healthy development, and part of a necessary two-step process in which
“first, a basic intuneness must exist between self and its selfobjects [and] second, selfobject failures (e.g., responses based on faulty empathy) of a non-traumatic degree must
occur” (Kohut, 1984, p. 70). Such failures lead to what Kohut referred to as optimal
frustrations—and which some others have preferred to re-label as optimal
responsiveness—which are a necessary part of psychological growth and personality
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development. These optimal frustrations lead in turn to the process Kohut labeled
transmuting internalization, whereby the self takes over functions previously fulfilled by
its selfobjects, thus reducing the importance of, or eliminating altogether the need for, the
presence of the selfobject (Goldstein, 2001). Transmuting internalization can be defined
as “the process through which a function formerly performed by another (selfobject) is
taken into the self through optimal mirroring, interaction, and frustration” (Elson, 1986,
p. 252).
It is important to note that while Kohut often emphasized the importance of early
interactions between self and selfobjects for healthy development, he believed that an
individual never outgrows the need for selfobjects. Indeed, he felt that “self-selfobject
relationships form the essence of psychological life from birth to death” (Kohut, 1984, p.
47) and that “the need for others to provide support and sustenance continues all through
life” (Goldstein, 2001, p. 81). Self psychology rejects the idea that complete autonomy
and independence are good indicators of psychological and emotional health; rather it
views an individual’s capacity to seek out gratifying selfobject experiences and establish
rewarding relationships with other people as the true sign of a healthy person (Goldstein,
2001).

Selfobject Needs
As mentioned earlier, Kohut believed that each of the three distinct poles of the
self—the grandiose self, the idealized parent imago, and the alter ego or twinship pole—
has its own particular selfobject needs. The pole of the grandiose self, for example,
requires mirroring selfobjects, “people who will reflect and identify its unique capacities,
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talents, and characteristics” (Berzoff, Flanagan, & Hertz, 2002, p. 181). Mirroring
responds to the needs of the grandiose self and allows the developing child to feel
admired, powerful, and special (Goldstein, 2001).
The pole of the idealized parent imago, which is the part of the self that holds an
internalized representation of an idealized other, needs selfobjects that can be viewed by
the self as special and competent so that the self can “have someone strong and calm to
idealize and merge with in order to feel safe and complete within the self” (Berzoff,
Flanagan, & Hertz, 2002, pp. 185-186). Such merger allows the establishment of the
calmness and competence of the selfobject within the self. This in turn allows the
individual to feel secure and soothed at times or at a stage of development when he or she
is not capable of soothing him- or herself.
The alter ego or twinship pole needs selfobjects that allow the self to feel that
there are others in the world to whom it is similar and with whom it shares
characteristics. This allows the self not to feel too different or isolated from others and
encourages a feeling within the self that it belongs in the world. It provides the self with a
sense of connectedness and kinship with others in the world.
Kohut believed that these selfobject needs—mirroring, idealizing, and twinship—
are present throughout one’s lifespan. These needs, however, manifest themselves in
different ways depending on the age and life-stage of the individual, and self
psychologists describe age-appropriate selfobject needs as those which are normally
required at certain ages in order to maintain an individual’s self-cohesion and sense of
well-being (Wolf, 1988). In the case of very young children—newborns, infants, and
toddlers—mirroring and idealizing selfobject needs must be fulfilled in order to allow
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them to build the internal self structure that allows them to develop a sense of their own
individuality and selfhood.
During the Oedipal phase, selfobject needs center around the child’s need to
strengthen self structure and develop a gender identity, which is accomplished by the
parents responding to the child’s need for confirmation of his or her autonomy and
maleness or femaleness. In later stages, from latency through adolescence and early
adulthood, selfobject needs continue, but there is a gradual shifting away from the child’s
focus on his or her parents as the fulfillers of those needs; peers, teachers, and elements
of age-group subcultures become sources of selfobject need fulfillment (Wolf, 1988).
Selfobject needs continue through adulthood and throughout the various life stages and
changing roles that come with the passage of time. Marriage, parenthood, middle-age,
and old-age all bring with them their own types of age-appropriate selfobject needs, and
the meeting of these needs continues to be important to the maintenance of a healthy,
cohesive self for as long as one’s life continues.

Psychopathology
As discussed previously, Kohut believed that psychopathology, in all its forms,
had as its source flaws in the self, all of which are due to disruptions in the relationship
between self and selfobjects during childhood (Kohut, 1984). Kohut felt that serious
disorders of the self come about as a result of a “child’s protracted exposure to a lack of
parental empathy in at least two areas of selfobject need” (Elson, 1986, p. 50), e.g., a lack
of sufficient mirroring and the absence of a suitable twin or alter ego. When selfobjects
fail a child—and his or her developing self—to such a degree, the critical process of
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transmuting internalization cannot occur, and thus the self is unable to properly develop
its own internal structures (Goldstein, 2001). From the perspective of self psychology,
what is most necessary for healthy development is the presence of empathically attuned
caregivers, ones who can serve as “mature, cohesive, parental [selves who are] in tune
with the changing needs of the child” (Kohut & Wolf, 1978, p. 417).
Kohut and Wolf (1978) classified self disorders into two different groups: primary
and secondary disturbances of the self. Secondary disturbances of the self are understood
to be normal reactions to a variety of circumstances that may be encountered during the
life course, including loss, illness, injury, and failure. Such circumstances are seen as
unavoidable and secondary disturbances of the self are described as non-pathological,
temporary reactions of an undamaged self to the often unfortunate vicissitudes of life
(Goldstein, 2001; Elson, 1986).
Kohut and Wolf (1978) divide the primary disturbances of the self into
subgroups, based on the severity and nature of the disturbance. These subgroups include
narcissistic personality and behavior disorders, borderline states, and psychoses. Kohut
believed that all of these conditions were related, but he viewed borderline states and
psychoses, which are characterized by serious damage to the self that is permanent or
prolonged, as much more severe than the narcissistic disorders (Goldstein, 2001). The
primary distinction between borderline states and psychoses is that in the case of
borderline states one often sees an individual who is comparatively high functioning and
whose defects are often covered by a series of complex and rigid defenses. Also, in the
case of psychoses, there is often a biological predisposition present that contributed to the
extent of the damage that was done to the self (Goldstein, 2001; Wolf, 1988).
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Narcissistic personality disorders and narcissistic behavior disorders differ
primarily, as their names suggest, in the way that their symptoms manifest—i.e., in
psychological states in the case of the former; in actions and interactions in the case of
the latter. With narcissistic personality disorders, one often sees individuals who are
prone to hypochondria, depression, and hypersensitivity to slights and disappointments.
Individuals with narcissistic behavior disorders often engage in behavior that is harmful
to themselves or others, including substance abuse, compulsive sexual behavior, and
criminal behavior (Kohut & Wolf, 1978; Wolf, 1988; Goldstein, 2001). Both types of
narcissistic disorder involve “the break-up, enfeeblement or serious distortion of the self”
(Kohut & Wolf, 1978, p. 416) and both are seen as being temporary and amenable to
psychotherapeutic treatment.
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CHAPTER IV
EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOTHERAPY

Introduction
This chapter begins by providing some of the historical context and background
regarding the development of existential psychotherapy. This chapter also introduces a
number of key terms and major concepts of existential psychotherapy, including
existential psychodynamics; the four “ultimate concerns” (Yalom, 1980, p. 8) of human
existence (i.e., death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness); boundary situations; and
existential anxiety. In addition, this chapter includes a brief discussion regarding some of
the ways in which these key concepts and terms are relevant to an understanding of
psychopathology from an existential psychotherapy perspective.
Before proceeding, I would like to provide the reader with a minor point of
clarification regarding my use of certain terms throughout this chapter. I have elected to
use the term existential psychotherapy to refer to my topic of focus. This is the term used
by Yalom (1980) and several other authors and is meant to serve, for my purposes, as an
umbrella term encompassing a number of different but related approaches to
psychiatry/analysis/psychotherapy. In referring to the works of some of these other
authors, I may use different terms in order to refer to a specific analytic approach or
school of thought, especially when quoting directly from authors’ works or when
discussing some of the historical background and context for the development of
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existential psychotherapy. Other such terms that may be encountered throughout this
chapter include existential analysis, Daseinsanalysis, logotherapy, and existential
therapy. While there are some differences and distinct areas of emphasis among some of
these approaches, they all share a number of elements in common and can, I believe,
safely be included within the fold of existential psychotherapy for the purposes of this
project.

History and Context
Existential Philosophy
While a comprehensive discussion of the history, themes, major figures, and
influence of existential philosophy is beyond the scope of this paper, a few brief
statements regarding the term might be helpful. Ellenberger (1958) defines existential
philosophy as “the philosophical trend of thought which takes as its focus of interest the
consideration of man’s most immediate experience, his own existence” (p. 117).
Ellenberger acknowledges that existential themes have been taken up by philosophers
and theologians “from time immemorial” (p. 117), but identifies the nineteenth century
Danish philosopher, Soren Kierkegaard as the first person to state explicitly its basic
assumptions. Kierkegaard’s thoughts and writings can be seen as a reaction to, or a
protest against the rationalism that permeated much of the scientific and philosophical
thinking of his time. He felt that the assertion that there was some sort of knowable
abstract, universal truth was a fallacy. Kierkegaard believed that one could know with
certainty only that which was “true” or “real” for oneself. He asserted that truth exists for
each individual only insofar as that individual produces it by means of his or her actions;
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thus there are as many “truths” as there are individuals (May, 1958). Ellenberger notes
that other thinkers since Kierkegaard have focused and elaborated on existential themes
during the twentieth century, and he cites Karl Jaspers, Jean-Paul Sartre, Martin
Heidegger, and Paul Tillich as among the most influential of these.
With regard to existentialist philosophy’s relationship to psychiatry and
psychology, Ellenberger identifies the work of Martin Heidegger, specifically citing
Heidegger’s book Being and Time, published in 1927, as having the most direct
influence. This is especially true in the case of Binswanger’s (1958b) development of his
own form of existential analysis which he called Daseinsanalysis, which he based almost
exclusively on the thought and writings of Heidegger. May (1958) writes that the
“existentialists are centrally concerned with rediscovering the living person amid the
compartmentalization and dehumanization of modern culture” (p. 14). In a similar vein,
Cooper (2003) frames existential philosophy as a reaction to modes of scientific and
philosophical thinking that take a reductionist and mechanistic view of human existence.

Development of Existential Psychotherapy
Origins. Existential psychotherapy has no single authoritative source or founder;
nor can it be said to have arisen at one particular time and place. Rather, it emerged
spontaneously and simultaneously in the works of several psychiatrists, psychologists,
and psychotherapists throughout Western Europe—and subsequently in the United
States—during the first half of the twentieth century (May & Yalom, 2000; Cooper,
2003). This emergence was due, in large part, to what was seen by many of the early
existentialists as an overemphasis on rationalism and scientific modes of thinking,
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especially as they had been applied to the understanding of human thought, emotion, and
behavior. Many of these early existential therapists felt that other psychotherapeutic
approaches of the day—e.g., Freudian psychoanalysis, behaviorism, Jungian
psychology—had made “man” into something of an abstraction and had, in a sense, lost
sight of the actual person to whom these theories and therapies were being applied; they
seemed to ignore subjective human experience (Bauman & Waldo, 1998; May & Yalom,
2000).
The work of a number of early existential therapists and theorists, including
Heidegger, Binswanger, Boss, May, Frankl, and others, is often framed primarily as a
reaction to, and a rejection of, many of the tenets of Freud’s (1923) approach to
psychoanalysis, in particular Freud’s concept of the human individual as one governed by
instincts and drives. The existentialists saw the Freudian conception of the human
condition as one in which the actual living, vital, immediate, and existing person had
been lost sight of (May & Yalom, 2000).
Daseinsanalysis. Ludwig Binswanger, a Swiss psychiatrist and a close friend and
associate of Freud, developed his own existential approach to psychoanalysis that he
termed Daseinsanalyse (or Daseinsanalysis or existential analysis). The name comes from
Heidegger’s term, dasein, translated as “being there,” which Heidegger used to refer to
the human individual, since human beings are defined primarily by the fact that they
exist, that they inhabit the world (Binswanger, 1958b). It is also important to note that,
similar to Kierkegaard, Binswanger used the term “dasein” in order to emphasize the fact
that each human being, though he or she exists and is “there” (“da”) in the world, at the
same time creates the world that he or she inhabits (Yalom, 1980). Binswanger described
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Daseinsanalysis, which was one of the earliest attempts to develop an existential
approach to therapy (Cooper, 2003), as “an anthropological type of scientific
investigation—that is, one which is aimed at the essence of being human” (Binswanger,
1958b, p. 191).
Binswanger found fault with Freud’s approach to psychoanalysis and what
Binswanger saw as Freud’s conceptualization of human beings as “an inhuman collection
of causal mechanisms, instincts and formulae” (Cooper, 2003 citing Binswanger, 1963).
He felt that this view of human beings was unnecessarily and inaccurately reductionist, in
that it seemed to ignore their actual lived reality in favor of seeking out their inner causal
mechanisms and component parts. Binswanger was also critical of what he saw as an
attempt by Freud to separate humans from the world in which they lived, citing this as an
example of the “subject-object divide” (Cooper, 2003, p. 35) that Binswanger and other
existentialists found troubling and which, in their view, permeated much of Western
psychological and psychoanalytical thinking of the time.
Medard Boss, a Swiss psychiatrist who was Binswanger’s friend and colleague,
worked with Binswanger on the development of Daseinsanalysis and eventually became
the most prominent advocate for the application of Heidegger’s thought to
psychotherapeutic practice. According to Boss—who, like Binswanger, was critical of
many of Freud’s ideas—one aim of Daseinsanalysis was to engage in psychotherapeutic
practice that paid attention to the genuine lived experience and the real, everyday lives of
individuals, rather than trying to understand these individuals in terms of drives or
instincts as in Freudian psychoanalysis (Cooper, 2003).
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Logotherapy. Victor Frankl (1959) developed his own form of existential
psychotherapy that he called logotherapy, from the Greek, logos, which translates as
“meaning.” In his development of logotherapy, he focused on the idea of there being a
human impetus to find or create meaning, even in the face of meaninglessness (one of the
four ultimate concerns of human existence mentioned earlier in this chapter). Frankl
asserted that “man’s search for meaning is the primary motivation in his life and not a
‘secondary rationalization’ of instinctual drives” (p. 121). This was, in part, Frankl’s way
of stating his rejection of the idea that human beings’ desire for meaning in their lives is
merely the product of the workings of drives and defense mechanisms taking place at a
level beneath their conscious awareness (Frankl, 1959).
Frankl (1959) often spoke of a “will to meaning” (p. 121) that he believed to be
present in all human beings. When Frankl speaks of meaning, he is not referring to it in
the sense of a grand, ultimate “meaning of life” that exists as a fixed, universal truth for
all. What Frankl is talking about is meaning on an individual, personal level, “the specific
meaning of a person’s life at a given moment” (p. 131). He believed that every individual
had a unique task or vocation that only he or she could fulfill and thus he saw an
individual’s attempt to find meaning in his or her life as something of a responsibility as
well as a source of motivation (Frankl, 1959; 1967). Frankl (1967) has written that “one
could define logotherapy by the literal translation as healing through meaning” (p. 140).
As a therapeutic approach, the goal of logotherapy is not to give clients meaning
in their lives, nor to tell them what it is that they should find meaningful. Instead,
logotherapy aims to help clients discover for themselves meaning and purpose in their
own lives and, by means of this discovery, overcome feelings of emptiness and despair
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(Cooper, 2003). According to Frankl (1959), logotherapy focuses on the future rather
than the past, being “less retrospective and less introspective” (p. 120) than Freudian
psychoanalysis.
Existential Psychotherapy in the United States. Rollo May (1958), an American
existential psychotherapist, is identified as the person primarily responsible for
introducing existential psychotherapy to the United States with the publication in 1958 of
Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology. It was by means of the
publication of this book that the writings of Binswanger and other European proponents
of existential psychotherapy were brought to the United States and gained a wider
audience (Cooper, 2003). The American tradition of existential therapy has tended to
focus more on the individualistic aspect of existentialist philosophy than its recent
European progenitors. In particular, it has emphasized the idea that human beings are
capable of standing alone and directly confronting “the anxiety of existence” (Cooper,
2003, p. 64).
Irvin Yalom, an American existential psychotherapist and by some referred to—
along with most other American existential psychotherapists—as an “existentialhumanist psychotherapist” (Bugental & Bracke, 1992; Cooper, 2003), has contributed
much to the field of existential psychotherapy in the United States, in particular by his
many writings on the subject, including the 1980 publication of Existential
Psychotherapy, which has since been frequently cited and is widely considered to be one
of the most comprehensive and accessible books on the topic of existential
psychotherapy. One aspect that Yalom has focused on in his writing and in his work as a
therapist is the importance of paying attention to how clients are feeling in the present
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moment—i.e., “in the ‘living moment’ of the therapeutic encounter” (Cooper, 2003, p.
70)—and this is in keeping with the existentialist mode of thinking wherein the
immediate, lived moment of the individual’s existence is the focus of attention.

Key Concepts
Existential Psychodynamics
Yalom (1980) offers a concise definition of existential psychotherapy, describing
it as “a dynamic approach to therapy which focuses on concerns that are rooted in the
individual’s existence” (p. 5). Existential psychotherapy is considered to be a dynamic
approach in that it holds that there are conscious and unconscious forces within each
individual. These forces often conflict with one another, and “thought, emotion, and
behavior, both adaptive and psychopathological, are the resultant of these conflicting
forces” (Yalom, 1980, p. 6). What makes existential psychotherapy’s approach different
from other dynamic approaches—Freud’s (1905) drive theory, to take one example—is
its understanding of the nature of these internal forces and the conflicts that occur. From
the existential psychotherapy perspective, internal conflicts arise not, as in Freudian
psychodynamics, as the result of a struggle between id and superego, nor due to sexual or
aggressive instincts. Instead, conflict arises as a result of an individual’s encounter with
“the givens of existence. … [i.e.,] certain ultimate concerns” (Yalom, 1980, p. 8) of
human life: death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness. In this framework the
individual is viewed primarily as fearful and suffering rather than instinctually driven; the
existential psychodynamic model begins with awareness and fear rather than instincts and
drives (Yalom, 1980; May & Yalom, 2000).
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Within the context of existential psychodynamics, there are also situations which
individuals encounter that are referred to as boundary situations. These are unavoidable
situations, inherent to human existence, “which cannot be dealt with by using the type of
rational knowledge used to solve problems in everyday life” (Gordon, 1999, p. 227).
According to Yalom (1980) a boundary situation is “a type of urgent experience that
propels the individual into a confrontation with an existential situation” (p. 159). A
boundary situation is seen as both a challenge and an opportunity. When faced with such
a situation, one can respond with fear, anxiety, or despair, but one can also respond by
gaining a greater sense of awareness and responsibility, and may choose to take an action
that will lead to a sense of well-being and achievement.

The “Ultimate Concerns” of Human Existence
Death. Within the theoretical framework of existential psychotherapy, human
beings’ confrontation with the idea of death, their understanding that they will one day
cease to exist, plays a significant role in their lives. Death is seen as a “core existential
conflict” (Yalom, 1980) that inevitably results in a certain amount of anxiety for every
individual. The conflict arises as a result of one’s awareness of the inevitability of death
juxtaposed with what most existential psychotherapists identify as human beings’
inherent wish to continue living indefinitely. “Man” is thus identified as a being who is
constantly aware “that at some future moment he will not be; he is the being who is
always in dialectical relation with non-being, death” (May, 1958, p. 42). This awareness
of and confrontation with death is inevitably a source of anxiety (Tillich, 1952; Yalom,
1980; May & Yalom, 2000) and, in the case of children, who normally become aware of
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and concerned with the idea of death at a very early age, coming to terms with and
accepting the idea of one’s eventual death—the knowledge that one will someday cease
to exist—is considered to be one of the primary developmental tasks of childhood
(Yalom, 1980, p. 76). Tillich (1952) saw the individual’s anxiety about death as
something inherent in the human condition, as an unavoidable component of one’s
existence and something that could not possibly be eliminated or avoided.
Death is often referred to by existentialist thinkers as a primary example of a
boundary situation. When an individual considers his or her own mortality and faces the
reality that he or she will one day cease to exist, one possible reaction to this is a sense of
dread or despair. However, it might just as well be the case that confronting the idea of
one’s own finiteness and eventual death could serve to “awaken the urgency of living
authentically without self-deception” (Gordon, 1999. p. 228) or shift “one away from
trivial preoccupations and [provide] life with depth and poignancy and an entirely
different perspective” (Yalom, 1980, p. 160).
Freedom. From the perspective of existential psychotherapy, the concept of
freedom has potentially frightening and disturbing implications. Whereas in most
discussions, the word “freedom” or the idea of being “free” has only positive
connotations, freedom carries additional weight and a deeper, more nuanced meaning as
seen through the lens of existential psychotherapy. According to the existentialists, if
humans are truly free, this implies that they are also utterly responsible and without any
sort of guidance or assistance as they make their way in life. Existential psychotherapists
hold that this freedom, and the responsibility that it implies, is often a source of great
anxiety for many individuals. Further, they posit that human beings desire to have some
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sort of guidance and structure in their lives. As Yalom (1980) has written, freedom, from
an existential therapy perspective, “has a terrifying implication: it means that beneath us
there is no ground—nothing, a void, an abyss (p. 8). In the context of existential
psychodynamics, this concept of freedom, or groundlessness, can be a source of
uncertainty and anxiety when juxtaposed with the innate human desire for ground, for
some kind of structure or guidance.
Isolation. Within the context of existential psychotherapy, the concept of isolation
refers primarily to a particular type of isolation, namely existential isolation. Yalom
(1980) describes three distinct types of isolation—all of which are likely to be
encountered by psychotherapists during their work with clients—that every human being
faces during the normal course of life. One of these is interpersonal isolation, which
refers to an individual’s isolation and separation from other individuals. This type of
isolation is generally experienced as loneliness. Another type of isolation, intrapersonal
isolation refers to an individual’s isolation from him- or herself. This would include
instances where an individual somehow stifles his or her own feelings, thoughts, or
desires. It would also include situations in which part of an individual’s self has been
partitioned off in some way, as in the case of a defense mechanism such as dissociation
or repression. The third type, and the one most germane to existential psychotherapy, is
existential isolation, which refers to “an unbridgeable gulf between oneself and any other
being. It refers … to an isolation even more fundamental—a separation between the
individual and the world” (p. 355). This third type, existential isolation, is an intrinsic
factor of human existence and persists regardless of how satisfied people are in their
relationships with others or how self-aware and well-integrated they are with themselves.
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Meaninglessness. From an existential perspective, an individual’s confrontation
with meaninglessness arises due to the fact that human beings seek meaning and yet are
adrift in a world without any set plan or direction for them to follow; their demand for
some sort of meaning or larger purpose in the universe goes unheard and unanswered
(Bauman & Waldo, 1998). The idea of a “will to meaning” (Frankl, 1959, p. 121) and
the utter importance of meaning for human life is a key aspect of existential
psychodynamics. Yalom (1980) makes this point when he addresses the difficulty of
confronting meaninglessness, writing that an “existential dynamic conflict stems from the
dilemma of a meaning-seeking creature who is thrown into a universe that has no
meaning” (p. 8). This is what Albert Camus, a French-Algerian writer and philosopher
whose works often addressed existential themes, would have recognized as being
reminiscent of his idea of the absurd—i.e., the situation that humans are faced with due to
the fact that they seek and need meaning, all the while being confronted by a world that is
meaningless and indifferent to this need (Camus, 1991). Existential philosophy
acknowledges meaninglessness in the larger world and asserts that human beings can
transcend it by creating meaning for themselves in their own immediate reality (Bauman
& Waldo, 1998). Existential psychotherapists accept this concept of meaninglessness and
attempt to put it into practice in their work with their patients, one goal of which is to
help each patient to discover what it is that might lend a sense of meaning or purpose to
his or her life.
It may be worth pointing out that the type of meaning being referred to here—the
meaning which Yalom, Camus, Frankl, and others speak of, and view as both valid and
necessary—is the type of meaning that an individual may find within his or her own life.
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Frankl (1959) writes that “this striving to find a meaning in one’s life is the primary
motivational force in man” (p. 121) and yet “what matters is not the meaning of life in
general, but rather the specific meaning of a person’s life at a given moment …. One
should not search for an abstract meaning of life” (p. 131). The point here is that, from an
existential psychotherapy perspective, while an individual may not be able to find
meaning in “the world” or “the universe,” this does not mean that he or she must not
attempt to live his or her life in a way that is meaningful on an individual, personal level.

Psychopathology
From the point of view of existential psychotherapy, many forms of
psychopathology are understood largely in terms of individuals’ confrontation with the
“givens of existence” (Yalom, 1980, p. 8)—i.e., the four ultimate concerns discussed
above (death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness)—and are all seen as beginning
with anxiety. Existential psychotherapists believe that a certain amount of existential
anxiety is inevitable and must be faced by all human beings due to the fact that everyone
confronts these ultimate concerns. Existential anxiety is further divided into two types—
normal anxiety and neurotic anxiety. When one’s anxiety seems reasonably proportional
to the situation being faced—admittedly a subjective judgment in many cases—and does
not require repression or the activation of defense mechanisms, it is referred to as normal
anxiety. Anxiety at the normal level is also seen as a potentially constructive or creative
force, in that it often leads individuals to seek and find a solution to the problem or
situation being faced. When an individual fails to maintain their inevitable existential
anxiety at a manageable level, it is then referred to as neurotic anxiety; this is the level
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and type of anxiety at which psychopathology occurs. This type of anxiety differs from
normal anxiety in that it is out of proportion with the situation being faced, often leads a
person to resort to repression, and is destructive rather than constructive (May & Yalom,
2000).
Yalom (1980) and May and Yalom (2000) have written that psychopathology, to
a significant extent, arises due to an individual’s inability to come to terms with the
inevitability of his or her eventual and inevitable death. These authors assert that
psychopathological symptoms as well as “maladaptive character structure have their
origin in the individual terror of death” (May and Yalom, 2000, p. 284). Yalom (1980)
asserts that those individuals who present as patients in clinical settings arrive there after
having “been driven to extreme modes of defense” (p. 111) after failing to find other
ways of coming to terms with their fear of death. It may be worth mentioning that, from
an existential perspective, psychopathology is a matter of degree rather than kind; “the
difference between normality and pathology is quantitative, not qualitative” (Yalom,
1980, p. 13). This statement is made in recognition of the fact that each and every
individual must at some point confront the inevitability of his or her eventual death, just
as we all must face the other “ultimate concerns” of human existence.
Frankl (1967), whose logotherapy holds meaning as its primary focus and
concern, believed that all human beings have, as their primary need in life, a need for
meaning and purpose. He saw psychopathology as the result of this “will to meaning”
(Frankl, 1959, p. 121) being somehow frustrated or blocked. He described a type of
problematic situation he referred to as an existential vacuum in which individuals
experience existential frustration. Frankl referred to this existential vacuum as “the mass
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neurosis of our age” (p. 140) and he believed that in “cases in which existential
frustration produces neurotic symptoms, one is dealing with a new type of neurosis
[which he called] ‘noogenic neurosis’” (p. 140). Frankl believed anxiety that rose to the
level of neurosis could be avoided, but he, like other existential psychotherapists,
acknowledged that a certain amount of existential anxiety was unavoidable. He believed
that this was an inevitable fact of life and unique to human beings and, in particular, those
living in the present age. Frankl believed that human beings, unlike animals, lacked
instincts and drives that guided them in their lives, and he also felt that human beings in
current times lacked belief in strict traditions and values that could govern them and tell
them what to do in their lives.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION

Introduction
In this chapter, the reader is presented with an analysis of SUDs using the two
theoretical lenses that are the focus of this study—self psychology and existential
therapy. The chapter begins by examining SUDs using two different models—deficit and
conflict—to explain the etiology and nature of these disorders. The chapter then
reintroduces a number of key concepts from both theories that were previously
introduced in Chapters III and IV, and discusses them here in the context of their
relevance to understanding the nature of SUDs. There is also a discussion regarding the
application of these key concepts from both theories in therapeutic treatment. The reader
is then presented with each of the two theories’ views regarding individuals’ early
development and its relevance to treatment. The chapter will also consider implications
of this study and these two theoretical perspectives for clinical practice involving work
with clients with SUDs.

Deficit vs. Conflict
Self Psychology: A Deficit Model
From the point of view of self psychology, SUDs are the result of deficits—i.e.,
defects or weakness in the self. Kohut (1978) considered “addictive behavior” to be a
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major symptom of narcissistic behavior disorders, which he believed were due to an
underlying disorder involving “the break-up, enfeeblement or serious distortion of the
self” (Kohut & Wolf, 1978, p. 416). Kohut (1977) sees in the addicted individual “a
central weakness … in the core of his personality [and] a defect in the self” (p. vii). In his
view, substance abuse is an ill-fated attempt to alleviate the distress caused by this defect.
Kohut saw ingestion of a drug as an attempt to fulfill needs that were not previously met
as they should have been by an individual’s selfobjects. Goldstein (2001) describes the
addicted individual as one who has an increased vulnerability to using substances because
of a lack of proper internal self structures; substance use is an attempt to make up for this
deficit.
Khantzian’s (1985/1997) self-medication hypothesis (SMH)—which posits that
addicts use substances in an attempt to self-medicate and find relief from their psychiatric
problems and difficult emotions—strikes a similar tone to that of Kohut’s conception of
the function of selfobjects. Khantzian, like Kohut, argues that the addicted individual
turns to substances seeking a method of fulfilling certain functions—e.g., affect
regulation, self-soothing, self-esteem—that the individual is unable to do for him- or
herself. Khantzian believes that SUDs are the result of deficits—i.e., defects or weakness
in the self—rather than intrapsychic conflict, and this too is in keeping with Kohut’s
perspective. Weegman (2002) examines SUDs from a self psychology perspective and
he, like Kohut and Khantzian, sees SUDs in terms of deficit rather than conflict. He
argues that “extensive damage to the self” (p. 49) is present in some individuals long
before they become addicted to drugs. He stresses the need for clinicians to appreciate the
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continuous “tragic interaction” (p. 49) between the damage and the addiction, the result
of which is a destructive and self-perpetuating spiral.
Wurmser (1974) sees the use of drugs as an effort at self-treatment and he argues
that drugs are employed as a means of defense against overwhelming affects and difficult
emotions. Wurmser (1974) and Khantzian (1997) both believe that there is a significance
to the particular substance that is selected by an individual—the “drug of choice”—since
different substances have different effects, and addicts tend to settle on the particular
substance(s) that help them cope with the specific affects and emotions that cause them
the most difficulty. Again, this echoes Kohut’s view of substance use as an attempt to use
drugs and alcohol as substitute selfobjects that can perform certain functions that these
individuals are unable to perform for themselves.

Existential Psychotherapy: A Conflict Model
Existential psychotherapy, like self psychology, rejects Freud’s concept of human
beings as creatures governed by instincts and drives. Both theories also share the view
that SUDs are an outward, behavioral manifestation of an underlying problem. A key
difference, however, is that while self psychology sees this problem in terms of deficit,
existential psychotherapy sees it in terms of conflict. The nature of the conflict that
existential writers describe involves the interaction between human beings’ needs/desires
and the realities of existence—e.g., the wish to go on living and the knowledge that death
is inevitable; the need for meaning in the face of meaninglessness; and the desire for
guidance and structure in the face of freedom and groundlessness.
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Theoretical Concepts
Selfobjects
While Kohut did not work primarily with addicted clients or deal with the issue of
SUDs explicitly in much of his work, the ideas he developed regarding the nature of
psychopathology in all its forms—one of which is addiction to drugs and/or alcohol—can
be helpful when thinking about and working with clients with SUDs. Kohut’s conception
of selfobjects and their functions is a good example of one such helpful idea. In self
psychology, selfobjects are objects outside of the self “that give the self what it needs in
order to become and remain energetic and cohesive” (Berzoff, Flanagan, & Hertz, 2002,
p. 181). As mentioned earlier, while selfobjects are usually people, they can also be
“things,” common examples of which include various enriching and creative pursuits
such as art, music, and literature. However, drugs and alcohol are also “things” that, for
some, may serve selfobject functions.
Kohut addressed the issue of addiction directly in one of his writings (1977),
arguing that individuals who are addicted to drugs use drugs as substitutes for selfobjects
that failed them traumatically at some point during their earlier psychological
development. That is to say, something vital to the healthy development of a cohesive
self was missing. According to Kohut, the drug-addicted individual, through use of the
drug, is attempting to satisfy his or her unfulfilled selfobject needs. Thus the drug may
serve as a mirroring selfobject that soothes and accepts, or as an idealized selfobject that
allows merger and provides the self with a sense of power (Kohut, 1977).
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Existential Psychodynamics
From the point of view of existential psychotherapy, individuals who become
addicted to drugs and alcohol often do so because of feelings of emptiness—a sort of
existential vacuum—which causes a great deal of distress and unhappiness. These
feelings of emptiness, when understood in the context of existential psychodynamics, are
seen as resulting from an individual’s confrontation with the existential realities of life—
i.e., the “ultimate concerns” of human existence: death, freedom, meaninglessness, and
isolation (Yalom, 1980). For individuals with SUDs, substance use is a means of seeking
relief from difficult emotions and experiencing pleasure. However, due to the temporary
nature of the effects of drugs and alcohol, the addicted individual becomes stuck in a selfperpetuating cycle in which only temporary relief can be achieved. The real root of the
individual’s problems—namely feelings of emptiness and a lack of meaning in his or her
life—is thus never addressed, and so the cycle continues, without any lasting
improvement or growth (Nicholson et al., 1994).
Binswanger (1944/1958) describes addiction, which he referred to as
toxicomania, as a case in which one sees a “striking case of universal existential craving
to which the ‘decision-inhibited’ man falls prey” (p. 347). In his discussion of the
experience of an addicted individual attempting to fulfill this existential craving,
Binswanger describes a self-perpetuating cycle in which individuals attempt to fill the
emptiness they feel and achieve enjoyment or pleasure by using drugs but then encounter
shame and disappointment when they are struck by the unreality of their experience. Such
negative feelings then compel these addicted individuals to repeat their substance use in
yet another attempt to escape or feel something more positive (Binswanger, 1944/1958).
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The Understimulated Self
In his discussions of various psychopathological conditions, Kohut (1978)
describes the understimulated self as a condition that comes about due to a lack of
stimulating responsiveness from the child’s selfobjects. The result is an individual who
lacks vitality and who is unable to feel a sense of excitement from within their own
selves. Thus, they must turn to external and artificial sources of stimulation in order to
stave off a sense of inner lethargy and deadness. In children this can involve a variety of
acting out behaviors, and in the case of adolescents and adults, drugs and alcohol provide
them with an external means of altering their inner state and producing feelings of
excitement. However, given the artificial and temporary nature of such methods, the
individual who relies on substances to induce excitement is caught up in an up-and-down
cycle of compulsive substance use during which no lasting change or strengthening of
self-structure can occur.

Transmuting Internalization
Khantzian echoes in his writing much that can be found in the ideas of Kohut’s
self psychology. Khantzian (2007) argues that individuals with SUDs suffer from certain
developmental deficits resulting from their failure to internalize soothing, comforting,
and validating aspects of attuned and empathic caregivers. This essentially parallels
Kohut’s description of the process of transmuting internalization, whereby the self takes
over functions previously performed by its selfobjects (e.g., soothing, affect regulation),
thus reducing or eliminating the need for the selfobject (Goldstein, 2001). Transmuting
internalization occurs through a process involving optimal mirroring, interaction, and
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frustration between the self and its selfobjects. When successful, this process allows the
developing self to reach a point where he or she is able to perform functions for which
selfobjects had to be relied on previously (Elson, 1986). Referring back to Khantzian’s
point, one result of the deficits that he notes regarding SUDs is that addicted individuals
rely on drugs and alcohol to help them perform functions like self-soothing and affect
regulation, since they were unable to internalize these functions through self-selfobject
interactions during their earlier development.

Narcissistic Crises
Wurmser (1974) attributes the initiation of compulsive drug use in most cases to
an acute narcissistic crisis, often occurring during adolescence and caused by events in
which an individual experiences intense feelings of disappointment, either toward others
or toward him- or herself. In such a crisis, the individual is overwhelmed with difficult
feelings and is unable to cope without some kind of artificial defense. Such
disappointments in the self and others seem reminiscent of Kohut’s ideas regarding the
tripolar self and the selfobject needs of each the three poles.
Looking at Wurmser’s statement regarding the occurrence of a narcissistic crisis
from a self psychology perspective, one can view the “intense disappointments” about
oneself as having a negative impact on the pole of the grandiose self—the pole that needs
to feel admired, powerful, and special. Similarly, the intense disappointments felt toward
others that Wurmser cites as a causal factor in narcissistic crises can be seen as having a
negative impact on the tripolar self in more than one way. It may be that the
disappointment is caused by a lack of proper mirroring, which is required by the
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grandiose self. It may also be the case that the disappointment is more of an issue related
to the pole of the idealized parent imago, which requires others whom the self can
idealize and look up to and whom the self can rely on and merge with in order to feel
safe.

Boundary Situations
The concept of boundary situations was discussed earlier in this paper, and I
mention it again here because it seems to be a useful concept to consider when examining
the issue of SUDs. In the context of existential psychodynamics, a boundary situation is
“a type of urgent experience that propels the individual into a confrontation with an
existential situation” (Yalom, 1980, p. 159). Such situations are seen as both a challenge
and an opportunity; one can respond with fear, anxiety, or despair, but one can also
respond by gaining a greater sense of awareness and responsibility, and may choose to
take an action that will lead to a sense of well-being and achievement.
This concept seems especially relevant to the experience of individuals with
SUDs, since many of them have, throughout the history of their substance use, been
brought closer to certain existential realities—e.g., death, isolation—than many other
people. Looking at substance use and addiction as a type of boundary situation can be
useful during treatment as a therapist attempts to understand the world and subjective
experience of a client struggling with addiction. While individuals may begin using drugs
and alcohol as a way of trying to manage difficulties involving a particular sort of
boundary situation, it may also be just such an encounter with an “existential reality”—
e.g. health problems, an overdose, damaged relationships—that led to the client’s
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decision to seek treatment in the first place. Thus it may be useful in helping the therapist
to keep such a client engaged in treatment and hopeful about the potential for positive
change in the future.

Treatment
Self Psychology
As discussed earlier, Kohut stressed the importance of selfobject experiences and
fulfilling relationships not only during early development but throughout one’s entire life.
This lifelong need for selfobject experiences is an important and useful consideration for
clinicians to be mindful of in their work with clients, since, from a self psychology
perspective, treatment is an opportunity for repair and the provision of new selfobject
experiences that may have been lacking earlier in clients’ lives. Therapy is seen as
another chance for individuals to repair existing self-deficits—otherwise referred to by
self psychologists as narcissistic vulnerability—and move forward in their development.
It is an opportunity for clients to grow and strengthen their personality in ways that they
were not able to do in the past.
Self psychology is an approach to psychotherapy in which a great deal of
emphasis is placed on the therapist’s use of empathy as the primary means of collecting
data and engaging with the patient. Kohut often emphasized the critical role of empathy,
which he referred to as vicarious introspection and defined as “the capacity to think and
feel oneself into the inner life of another person” (Kohut, 1984, p. 82). Indeed, he
believed that it was empathy—and empathy alone—that would make it possible for the
therapist to engage with the patient. Kohut went so far as to label empathy as “the
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operation that defines psychoanalysis” (Kohut, 1984, p. 175) and to assert that it would
be impossible for a clinician to gain any real understanding of clients’ complex mental
states and processes without the use of empathy.
As mentioned previously, Kohut believed that all psychopathology—including
SUDs—has as its source flaws in the self, all of which are due to disruptions in the
relationship between self and selfobjects during childhood (Kohut, 1984). Given this
understanding, self psychology approaches the treatment of SUDs as it would many other
forms of psychopathology. However, Kohut (1959) has made some specific comments
regarding the treatment of addicted clients, stating that during the process of therapy, the
addicted client, in a way, becomes addicted to the therapist. Kohut believes that this is a
normal part of the treatment process for individuals with SUDs; however, he points out
that this is new addiction should not be confused with transference. In such cases, “the
therapist is not a screen for the projection of existing psychological structure but a
substitute for it” (p. 476). As a substitute for weak or missing aspects of the client’s
psychological structure, the therapist is serving a similar purpose to that which the drug
had been serving before the client entered treatment. What clients need in such cases are
the continued empathy, soothing, and support of the therapist; given time and the ongoing
engagement within the therapeutic relationship, the client will eventually be able to
strengthen his or her own psychological structure and become less dependent on the
therapist as a substitute.
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Existential Psychotherapy
With regard to treatment, existential therapists place emphasis on the importance
of the therapist’s effort and ability to understand the client; all other concerns are
considered to be less important. May (1983) believes that technique follows
understanding and that being able to understand a client is in fact the “central task and
responsibility” (p. 151) of the therapist. He argues that all other considerations, including
one’s theoretical orientation or particular therapeutic method, are secondary to achieving
this understanding. May acknowledges the wide range of therapeutic techniques that have
been employed by various existential therapists. From an existential therapy perspective,
the most important consideration regarding the use of one technique or another is the
reason that it is being used and the purpose that it will serve in the work with a particular
client at a particular time. As a theoretical framework, existential therapy is intended to
provide therapists with a perspective that will help them to understand their clients’ world
and subjective experience. As such, therapists are free to employ any technique in pursuit
of such understanding and in order to encourage their clients’ growth and psychological
well-being (Bauman & Waldo, 1998).
In their work with addicted clients, it is important for clinicians to try to
understand the role that drugs or alcohol played in these clients’ lives so as to appreciate
the nature of the void that is inevitably created by the removal of these substances once
the clients have stopped using drugs or alcohol. Once individuals with SUDs enter
treatment and stop using drugs or alcohol, attention must be paid to the void that has been
left, the needs that are no longer being fulfilled by means of the use and effects of
substances. Meaning—on an individual, personal level—is an important, if not essential,
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focus of consideration for individuals in treatment for and seeking recovery from SUDs.
Hull (1987) acknowledges this, arguing that individuals in recovery will be better able to
manage stress and avoid relapse if they can develop a sense of meaning or purpose in
their lives. This is in keeping with many of the ideas put forth by Frankl in his
logotherapy-based approach to understanding psychopathology, wherein he argues that
the problem of an “existential void”—a feeling of emptiness resulting form a lack of
meaning or purpose in one’s life—is often the cause of emotional distress and
psychopathology (Frankl, 1959).
The importance of addressing clients’ need for some sort of meaning in their lives
may be especially significant in the case of individuals with SUDs. Frankl (1967, as cited
in Nicholson et al., 1994) has argued that individuals may develop SUDs because they
lack meaning in their lives. If one views the problem of SUDs through the lens of
Frankl’s logotherapy, one might view an individual’s addiction to drugs or alcohol as the
result of a belief that his or her life is meaningless. Frankl believed that the search for a
meaning or purpose in life—a “will to meaning” (Frankl, 1959, p. 121)—was an intrinsic
part of being human. He argued that if this pursuit was somehow blocked, the result
would be an existential vacuum in which an individual’s life would lose all meaning. In
such cases the use of substances can be seen as an attempt to fill this existential vacuum
(1967, as cited in Nicholson et al., 1994).
It is not the intention of existential psychotherapists to eliminate all existential
anxiety from their clients’ lives—even if such a feat were possible, they would not see it
as desirable. Existential therapists believe that a normal amount of anxiety can actually
be a constructive or creative force, in that it often leads individuals to seek and find a
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solution to the problem or situation being faced. However, when an individual fails to
maintain their inevitable existential anxiety at a manageable level, it is then referred to as
neurotic anxiety; this is the level and type of anxiety at which psychopathology occurs.
This type of anxiety differs from normal anxiety in that it is out of proportion with the
situation being faced, often leads a person to resort to repression, and is destructive rather
than constructive (May & Yalom, 2000).
In the end, existential psychotherapy takes a very respectful view of clients and
their struggles, as clients’ difficulties are seen as the result of universal concerns and
things which all individuals must deal with during the life course. As mentioned earlier,
existential psychotherapists view psychopathology as a “matter of degree rather than
kind” and as quantitative rather than qualitative—we all face these issues, but in the cases
of certain individuals, coping skills fail and psychopathology results (Yalom, 1980).

Development
Self Psychology
Because self psychologists view SUDs and other forms of psychopathology as the
result of problems during early development, they focus a great deal of attention on
learning about a client’s childhood and his or her self-selfobject relationships. The point
of this is that self psychologists view therapy as an opportunity for repair and further
development, so the present relationship in the therapeutic dyad is seen in part as a way
of gaining insight into the nature of the disruptions and developmental failures that
occurred earlier in the client’s life. This knowledge can then allow for greater
understanding of a particular client’s needs and the nature of his or her deficits. During
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therapy, self psychologists expect that selfobject transferences will occur in which the
client reenacts frustrating early selfobject experiences “in the new, more empathic and
non-judgmental context of treatment” (Goldstein, 2001, p. 111). Thus the therapist’s
experiences with the client in the present therapeutic relationship help to provide a
window into the client’s experiences and difficulties in the past.

Existential Psychotherapy
Existential psychotherapists place much less emphasis than do self psychologists
on early development and its impact on the client in the present moment. It would not be
true to say that early development is seen as unimportant; Yalom (1980) writes about the
importance of the child’s developmental task of coming to terms with and accepting the
idea of his or her eventual death, as well as the inevitable death of loved ones. However,
developmental issues are considered to be much less relevant than what the client is
feeling and experiencing in the here-and-now. The question of what, at the present
moment, is the source of the client’s deepest fears and most intense anxiety, is not seen as
one that can be answered by looking into the client’s earliest experiences. This is also an
example of the different view that existential therapists have of words like “deep” and
“fundamental” as compared with most other psychodynamic theories. Existential
therapists do not see a justification for equating words like “deep” and “fundamental”
with the idea of “earliest”—for them, “to explore deeply from an existential perspective
does not mean that one explores the past; rather, it means that one brushes away everyday
concerns and thinks deeply about one’s existential situation” (Yalom, 1980, p. 11).
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Implications for Clinical Social Work Practice
Despite the many differences that become apparent when looking at these two
theories alongside one another, self psychology and existential psychotherapy share some
important qualities that make them useful for clinical social workers and which are in
keeping with the ethics and mission of the profession. Both of the theories that are
examined in this study take a very optimistic view of the potential for clients to heal and
improve their lives through treatment. While self psychology sees psychopathology in
terms of deficit and past damage, it also places a great deal of emphasis on the potential
for repair and future development through the new and supportive selfobject experiences
that can occur during therapy. So, while self psychologists look to the past for sources of
current defects and difficulties, they see selfobject needs and continued development as a
lifelong process, so the opportunity for healing and growth is always present.
Existential psychotherapists are also optimistic about the potential for healing and
positive change, though they focus more on addressing a client’s immediate lived
existence and place much less emphasis on working through problems originating in the
past. From an existential psychotherapy perspective, therapists believe that they can work
with clients to help them achieve new perspectives regarding their existential situation.
Therapy is also seen as an opportunity to help clients understand that that all human
beings face challenges and fears similar to theirs, whether it is the inevitability of death or
the search for some kind of meaning in life.
Both theories also focus on the importance of imperfect attunement and empathic
failures between therapist and client during the course of therapy. For self psychologists,
such occurrences are seen as being necessary to further development, since they provide
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new opportunities for clients to work through past disruptions in their selfobject
relationships and experience the process of transmuting internalization. Similarly,
existential psychotherapists believe that it is important for clients to learn what they can
and cannot get from relationships with others, so the client-therapist relationship is seen
as an opportunity to model a deep but realistically imperfect relationship between two
real people in the world. Existential therapists believe that clients’ experiences in their
relationships with their therapists will help them in their other present and future
relationships.
Another area of overlap between the two theories that is relevant to clinical
practice is their concern with the subjective experience of the client. In self psychology,
this can be seen in Kohut’s and others’ focus on the importance of empathy as a
therapeutic tool. Indeed, as mentioned previously, Kohut cited empathy as the therapist’s
primary method of collecting data and engaging with the patient. Kohut referred to
empathy as “vicarious introspection” and defined it as “the capacity to think and feel
oneself into the inner life of another person” (Kohut, 1984, p. 82). Furthermore, Kohut
asserted that it would be impossible for a clinician to gain any real understanding of
clients’ complex mental states and processes without the use of empathy. While
existential therapists do not write often about “empathy” as such, they do discuss, in a
similar vein, the importance of understanding the client’s world and subjective
experience. It would seem that whether or not one chooses to describe it in the same
terms, self psychologists and existential psychotherapists would affirm May’s (1983)
assertion that being able to understand a client is in fact the “central task and
responsibility” (p. 151) of the therapist.
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Conclusion
The central guiding question of this theoretical thesis has been, “How can the
theoretical lenses of self psychology and existential therapy help clinical social workers
and other mental health professionals better understand substance use disorders (SUDs)
and inform their work with addicted clients?” The two chosen theories were used
together in order to better understand the nature of SUDs as well as the underlying
psychological and existential factors that may contribute to the development and
persistence of such disorders in certain individuals. It is hoped that further exploration of
the compatibility of these two theoretical perspectives in the treatment of clients with
SUDs can occur in the future. One area of potential focus in pursuit of this would be to
collect data in the form of personal accounts from any clinicians who have relied on both
of these theoretical lenses to inform their clinical work with their addicted clients.
It is believed by this writer that both of these two theoretical lenses—separately
and even more so together—can be useful to clinicians when thinking about treatment
options in their work with clients with SUDs. As mentioned earlier, both of these
theories, despite their many differences, share a number of important similarities that
make them useful for clinical social work. These include an optimistic view of the
potential for growth and healing through treatment; an emphasis on trying to understand
the client’s subjective experience; and a genuinely humane and respectful view of all
clients, including those struggling with SUDs.
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